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There is no question that biases exist in people’s self-perceptions of their personality.  
However, it is not known whether people are aware of these self-biases.  In two studies 
(N = 130), I examined whether people have insight into their positive and negative self-
biases across a range of traits.  I predicted that self-biases result from self-deception (i.e., 
the intentional distortion of more realistic self-views), and as such, people should have 
some awareness of their self-biases.  As predicted, people with positive biases (i.e., self-
perceptions that are more positive than a reputation-based criterion measure) described 
themselves as positively biased, and people with overly negative self-views described 
themselves as negatively biased.  These findings suggest that people may know more 
about themselves than they initially admit, and provide support for the existence of 
everyday self-deception in people’s views of their personality.  Implications for the use of 
self-reports and the study of self-knowledge are discussed.  
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“He had two selves within him apparently, and they must learn to accommodate each 
other and bear reciprocal impediments.  Strange, that some of us, with quick alternate 
vision, see beyond our infatuations, and even while we rave on the heights, behold the 
wide plain where our persistent self pauses and awaits us.” 
- Middlemarch, p. 231, George Eliot 
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As Eliot’s quote suggests, people may have more than one self-view.  If this is the 
case, which self-view do we capture when people describe what they are like on self-
perception measures?  Perhaps more importantly, do we assess a person’s most accurate 
self-view?  Recent work has highlighted the many blind spots in self-knowledge, but it 
may be that people have more insight into what they are like than it seems at first glance.  
Specifically, the self-view people provide in personality questionnaires may not be their 
most accurate self-view, and people might know that these self-views are not entirely 
accurate.  In this paper, I examine to what extent people, when asked, can accurately 
report on the biases in their self-perceptions of personality.  Awareness of these biases 
would indicate that people have more self-knowledge of their personality than the 
research to date suggests.  
There is no question that biases exist in people’s self-perceptions (Dunning, 
Heath, & Suls, 2004).  Biases are present in all aspects of self-perceptions, from self-
views of skills and abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) to personality traits (Back & 
Vazire, 2012; John & Robins, 1994; Vazire, 2010).  Self-biases lead to both overly 
positive self-views (i.e., self-enhancement) and overly negative self-views (i.e., self-
diminishment).  On average, people tend to self-enhance, for example, reporting that they 
are more charitable, fairer, better drivers, and better teachers than their peers and 
colleagues (Alicke, 1985; Cross, 1977; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Messick, Bloom, 
Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Sedikides, 1993; Svenson, 1981; Van Lange & Sedikides, 
1998).  However, self-perceptions can also be overly negative, for example, when a skill 
is particularly uncommon (e.g., juggling; Kruger, 1999).  Furthermore, there are 
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considerable individual differences in the direction and magnitude of self-biases (John & 
Robins, 1994; Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004).  Narcissists and individuals 
with high self-esteem are prone to self-enhancement whereas individuals with low self-
esteem tend to rate themselves more harshly than is warranted (Baumeister, 1982; 
Campbell & Fehr, 1990; John & Robins, 1994).  
Some of these individual differences in positive and negative self-biases are in 
part due to the various motivations that self-perceptions fall victim to.  Motivations, such 
as the desires to self-enhance, to self-verify, to self-improve, and to self-assess (Sedikides 
& Strube, 1995), are more or less salient for specific types of people and in different 
situations.  With these multiple, competing motives at play in self-perception, attaining or 
maintaining accurate self-views is not always a priority (e.g., Sedikides, 1993).  Thus, it 
may be naïve for researchers to assume that people are striving to be accurate when 
providing self-ratings, and it may be unfair to interpret a person’s self-report as her most 
accurate guess about what she is like.  In fact, it is possible that people know that they are 
not always striving to be accurate, and may even be aware of the motives that are 
influencing their self-perceptions.  If so, people may have insight into when their self-
views are biased as well as the direction and magnitude of those self-biases.  
On the other hand, perhaps it is too much to ask of people to be aware of 
motivational influences on their self-perceptions.  As previous literature has suggested, 
there is a lot people are unaware of and inaccurate about regarding their mental processes 
(e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Research has demonstrated that people believe they are 
less prone to bias than their peers, and that the majority of people believe their self-
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perceptions are in general accurate, even when confronted with information about the 
various biases to which people are susceptible (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005; 
Pronin, 2007; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002; Vazire & Mehl, 2008).  These biases are so 
robust that at times people are even less accurate than close others about their own 
personality (Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996), particularly for evaluative traits (John & 
Robins, 1993; Vazire, 2010).  Taken together, these findings suggest a clear lack of self-
insight in many important areas of life, and in particular about motivated cognitive 
processes when judging one’s own evaluative traits (e.g., Dunning et al., 2004; Vazire, 
2010). 
Despite this compelling evidence that people lack insight into their own 
personality traits, I predict that directly asking people about the biases in their self-views 
will reveal that people actually know more than their self-ratings suggest.  I propose that 
people report overly positive or negative self-views because they are engaging in self-
deception.  Self-deception has been defined in many ways; I use it here to mean “the act 
of lying to oneself”1 (Paulhus & Buckels, 2012).  This type of self-deception typically 
occurs when two self-views are held simultaneously, but one is dominant due to 
underlying motivations (Gur & Sackeim, 1979).  Because this type of self-deception 
requires that individuals first be aware (at some level) of the truth that they do not desire 
to acknowledge, people may indeed possess relatively accurate self-views that are simply 
overshadowed by the desire to see oneself in a positive or negative light.  In other words, 
self-deception may not be so deep as to be unconscious, making it possible for people to 
                                                        
1
 I define self-deception broadly.  I believe, however, that the present results have important implications 
regardless of whether one subscribes to this definition of self-deception or not.  
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report on it.  Past research on self-deception has primarily examined its existence and 
process (Gur & Sackeim, 1979; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984) but has yet to examine 
whether it is present in self-perceptions of personality (c.f., Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 
2011).  If the biases that are often found in self-perceptions result from everyday self-
deception, people may have insight into their true self beyond their biases (because self-
deception requires some awareness of the reality that is being obscured). 
Across two studies, I tested the prediction that people are aware of the positive 
and negative biases in their self-views of personality.  Participants first completed 
traditional self-reports of personality traits.  Next, participants were asked to review their 
self-reports of personality and rate how positively or negatively biased they believed their 
initial self-ratings were (i.e., their perceived bias).  In order to assess actual bias in self-
ratings of personality, self-reports were compared to a criterion measure.  In selecting a 
criterion measure, I needed a measure of personality traits that was both valid and 
independent of self-reports.  Previous research shows that well-acquainted peers are very 
accurate judges of personality, and are even more accurate than the self for evaluative 
traits (John & Robins, 1993; Vazire, 2010).  The present study focused heavily on highly 
evaluative traits (because self-biases are likely to be strongest for these traits), and many 
of these traits are largely reputation-based (i.e., how funny, likeable, and attractive a 
person is depends largely on how funny, likeable, and attractive others find her).  Thus, I 
reasoned that well-acquainted peers’ perceptions (“other-perceptions”) would be a good 
criterion because their ratings do not have method overlap with self-reports and are likely 
to be highly accurate.  Specifically, I measured actual bias as the discrepancy between 
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self- and other-perceptions.  By correlating actual bias scores with perceived bias scores, 
I was able to gauge the degree of people’s self-knowledge of their bias.  This design 
allowed me to examine whether people have some awareness of the motivated cognitive 
processes distorting their self-views, thereby testing the hypothesis that people are 
engaging in everyday self-deception when providing self-ratings.  Positive correlations 
between actual and perceived bias would suggest that people are engaging in self-
deception and that they are able to accurately report on the biases in their ‘default’ self-
views.   
The present two studies were very similar to each other.  Study 1 was completed 
in a laboratory and participants reported their perceived bias four days after providing 
traditional self-reports.  In Study 2, a classroom-based study, I sought to replicate the 
findings of Study 1 and to implement a few small changes to the design.  Specifically, in 
Study 2, perceived bias reports were assessed immediately after traditional self-reports, 
allowing for a more direct examination of whether people concurrently hold both biased 
and realistic views of the self.  In other words, I examined whether people who provide 
biased self-reports can immediately turn around and accurately report on their bias.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants
2
 were 85 undergraduate students at Washington University in 
St. Louis (57 women, 28 men; Mage = 20.15, SDage = 1.67) who completed the study for 
                                                        
2, 3
 Participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 were part of larger studies. Full details of these studies are 
available from the study author. Data from these studies are also used in Carlson (in press) and Solomon & 
Vazire (2012), but the analyses presented here do not overlap with the analyses in those papers. 
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pay or class credit.  The majority of participants were Caucasian or White (58.8%), and 
smaller proportions were Asian (23.5%), African-American or Black (10.6%), Hispanic 
(2.4%), of mixed ethnicity (1.2%), and other (2.4%); one participant did not report 
ethnicity (1.2%). 
Design and procedure. Participants completed self-reports of personality including the 
Big Five (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) and five single-item measures of 
evaluative traits (i.e., intelligent, funny, likeable, physically attractive, and high status) on 
a 15-point scale in the lab.  These evaluative traits were selected because they are highly 
desirable and thus likely to elicit biased self-perceptions (Vazire, 2010).  In addition to 
traditional self-reports, participants also completed generalized meta-perceptions 
indicating how they believed people who knew them well saw them on the same items 
included in self-reports.  Finally, each participant also nominated up to five peers (e.g., 
friends, roommates) who were asked to describe the participant’s personality. 
Four days after the initial session, participants returned to the lab for a follow-up 
session.  They were given a printed copy of their self-ratings from the first session and an 
electronic copy of a new questionnaire I designed to measure self-perceptions of bias.  
The instructions for the perceived bias survey asked participants “How biased were you 
in your original response to the items below when you rated yourself earlier?”  I also 
provided definitions of positively biased (“you rated yourself more favorably than is 
objectively warranted”) and negatively biased (“you rated yourself more harshly than is 
objectively warranted”).  Participants rated their bias for each item on a 9-point scale 
from -4 (Extremely negatively biased) to +4 (Extremely positively biased) with a 
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midpoint of 0 (Neither negatively not positively biased).  Because the wording of the 
instructions posed a double negative for undesirable items (e.g., “critical, quarrelsome”), 
and reliability analyses suggested that people may not have interpreted these items 
correctly, only positively-phrased items were used for later analyses. 
Following the second session, the close others whom participants nominated (N = 
403) were contacted by email and asked to complete informant reports for the targets 
(following the procedures described by Vazire, 2006).  One hundred and ninety-six peer 
informants responded (48.6% response rate), with at least one informant for 87.1% of 
participants.  Thus, the final sample size for the current analyses (excluding participants 
whose informants did not respond and 11 participants who did not complete the 
perceived bias measure) was 65.   
Results and Discussion 
Means and standard deviations for self-perceptions, meta-perceptions, other-
perceptions, and bias-perceptions for the 10 traits examined can be found in Table 1.  In 
addition, Table 2 displays intercorrelations among self-, meta-, other-, and bias-
perceptions, averaged across the 10 traits (using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation to compute 
the average, which was then transformed back to a correlation).  Participants 
demonstrated only moderate agreement with their reputation, as evidenced by the 
moderate correlation between self- and other-perceptions (mean r = .23). 
Informant reports were aggregated and served as an accuracy criterion for 
participants’ self-ratings.  For each of the 10 traits, actual bias was calculated by 
regressing self-perceptions onto aggregated informant reports.  The resulting standardized 
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residuals (“self-other residuals”) were saved and served as measures of actual bias, that 
is, how much each participant self-enhanced or self-diminished (the self-criterion residual 
technique; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus & John, 1994).  Panel C of Figure 1 shows a 
histogram of actual bias scores for a representative trait from Study 1.  As this figure 
shows, the sample included self-enhancers and self-diminishers, as well as a moderate 
proportion of people who were relatively unbiased.  In addition, Panel A of Figure 1 
displays a histogram of participants’ perceived bias scores, that is, their responses to the 
self-report measure of perceived bias, for one of the traits.  As this figure shows, people 
were willing to admit both positive and negative self-biases.   
In order to assess whether people are able to accurately report their biases, actual 
bias scores were correlated with perceived bias scores for each trait.  I found that 
perceived bias significantly correlated with actual bias scores for all of the traits 
examined (Pearson r correlations ranging from .30 to .64; see Table 3).  Knowledge of 
bias was particularly high for: dependable, self-disciplined; sympathetic, warm; calm, 
emotionally stable; intelligent; funny; and physically attractive (all rs = .40 or higher).  
These findings provide support for the hypothesis that people are deceiving themselves 
but in doing so are partially aware of their underlying true self. 
 One possible reason for why people are able to accurately report their biases is 
that people are considering how they believe others perceive them (i.e., their meta-
perceptions).  That is, when people are determining self-bias, they may be thinking about 
the discrepancy between how they view themselves and how they believe others view 
them (although I did not specify this—or any—definition of “bias” and “accuracy” in the 
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perceived bias questionnaire).  If this were the case, then perceived bias should correlate 
with the discrepancy between self-perceptions and meta-perceptions, that is, with 
people’s views about the difference between how they see themselves and how others see 
them (a discrepancy that has been called “meta-insight”; Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011).  
To examine whether people’s perceptions of bias were indeed similar to this perceived 
discrepancy, I first computed a measure of self-meta discrepancy by regressing self-
perceptions onto meta-perceptions and saving the standardized residuals (“self-meta 
residuals”).  These standardized residuals indicated the extent to which people’s self-
perceptions departed from their meta-perceptions and could then be correlated with 
perceived bias scores to determine if people were in part using their self-meta 
discrepancy to ascertain their bias.  If perceived bias is just another measure of meta-
perceptions, self-meta residuals should strongly correlate with perceived bias scores.  As 
shown in Table 3, I found that self-meta residuals correlated significantly with perceived 
bias, indicating that participants were likely using their meta-perceptions at least in part 
when determining how biased their self-perceptions were.  Because the instructions on 
the perceived bias questionnaire did not indicate a criterion, this suggests that people may 
see their meta-perceptions as more accurate and less biased than their self-perceptions.  
I next wanted to test whether people’s perceived bias scores were only picking up 
on the discrepancy between their self- and meta-perceptions, or whether perceived bias 
scores were also capturing some information beyond meta-perceptions.  If perceived bias 
scores are based on more than just meta-perceptions, then they should predict not just the 
difference between self- and other-perceptions (i.e., actual self-bias) but also the 
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difference between meta-perceptions and other-perceptions (i.e., actual meta-bias).  To 
test this, I first regressed meta-perceptions onto other-perceptions and saved the 
standardized residuals (“meta-other residuals”).  These residuals were then correlated 
with perceived bias to determine if perceived bias also correlated with actual meta-bias.  
The correlations were positive for all traits and significant for five traits, indicating that 
people’s perceived biases are not entirely based on how they think they are seen by 
others, at least for certain traits (see Table 3). 
Study 2 
Study 2 was conducted to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1.  To more 
effectively examine whether people simultaneously hold both biased and realistic views 
of the self, self-reports of bias were collected immediately following the traditional self-
reports of personality.  In addition, as an alternative measure of meta-perception to those 
collected in Study 1, meta-perceptions were collected for each of the nominated close 
others and then aggregated to form a generalized meta-perception score for each 
participant, allowing for a more precise assessment of perceived reputation. 
Method 
Participants. Participants
3
 were 94 undergraduate students (59 women, 30 men, 5 
no gender reported; Mage = 19.96, SDage = 1.00) who completed the study as part of class 
activities in an undergraduate-level personality psychology course.  The majority of 
participants were Caucasian or White (56.4%), and smaller proportions were Asian 
(25.5%), African-American or Black (5.3%), and other (7.4%); a few participants chose 
not to report their ethnicity (5.3%).   
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Design and procedure. The procedure for Study 2 was almost identical to the 
procedure for Study 1.  As part of a classroom activity, participants first completed 
traditional self-reports of personality.  Immediately following these reports, participants 
were asked to report how positively or negatively biased their initial self-perceptions 
were while still having access to these self-reports using the same perceived bias measure 
as in Study 1.  In order to avoid the possibility that participants would have informant 
reports in mind as a criterion when completing the other measures, I collected informant 
nominations nine weeks before the self-report measures were collected.  Finally, unlike in 
Study 1, participants completed meta-perceptions indicating how they believed they were 
seen by each of their informants.  These were collected eight weeks prior to collecting 
self-report measures.  
Nine weeks prior to participants completing traditional self-reports and the 
perceived bias measure, nominated informants (N = 233) were contacted and asked to 
provide other-perceptions of participants’ personality.  One hundred and twenty-five peer 
informants responded (53.6% response rate), with at least one informant for 87.2% of the 
82 participants who nominated informants.  Thus, the final sample size for the present 
analyses (excluding participants whose informants did not respond and five participants 
who did not complete the perceived bias measure) was 65.   
Results and Discussion 
Means and standard deviations for self-, meta-, other-, and bias-perceptions for 
the 10 traits examined can be found in Table 4.  In addition, Table 2 displays 
intercorrelations among self-, meta-, other-, and bias-perceptions, averaged across the 10 
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traits (using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation to compute the average, which was then 
transformed back to a correlation).  These intercorrelations replicate those found in Study 
1, and again demonstrate a moderate level of agreement between self- and other-
perceptions (mean r = .23). 
Actual bias was calculated as in Study 1 by regressing self-perceptions on 
aggregated informant reports (a histogram of actual bias scores for one of these traits can 
be found in Panel D of Figure 1).  Actual bias scores were then correlated with perceived 
bias for each trait (a histogram of perceived bias scores for one of these traits can be 
found in Panel B of Figure 1).  As shown in Table 3, participants’ actual bias correlated 
significantly with their perceived bias for all traits, indicating that they were aware of the 
bias in their self-views (Pearson r correlations ranging from .34 to .65).  Knowledge of 
bias was particularly high for: open to new experiences, complex; sympathetic, warm; 
calm, emotionally stable; funny; likeable; physically attractive, and has high status (all rs 
= .40 or higher).   
As in Study 1, I examined the extent to which people used their meta-perceptions 
when determining their self-bias.  As before, the discrepancy between self- and meta-
perceptions correlated significantly with all but one of the traits examined (see Table 3), 
suggesting that meta-perceptions were likely considered when individuals determined 
their perceived bias.  Finally, as in Study 1, when meta-perceptions were regressed on 
aggregated informant reports, these standardized residuals still correlated positively with 
perceived biased, and these correlations were significant for six traits (see Table 3), 
  
14 
 
 
 
 
suggesting that people were not basing their perceived bias scores entirely on their meta-
perceptions.   
General Discussion 
Overall, the findings from these two studies suggest that people are surprisingly 
aware of the biases in their self-views.  These results provide evidence that people engage 
in everyday self-deception when reporting their self-perceptions of personality, and that 
they are capable of tapping into more accurate self-perceptions when prompted to do so.  
Furthermore, although this awareness of bias is in part due to people recognizing the 
discrepancy between their self-views and their meta-perceptions, these results also 
provide evidence that people’s awareness of their bias sometimes goes beyond what is 
captured by their meta-perceptions.  Taken together, these findings suggest that people 
are able to hold two self-views—their default, often biased, self-perception and a 
realistic, less biased self-view.   
It is also important to note that, like previous research (e.g., Kwan et al., 2004), I 
found strong evidence of large individual differences in self-bias.  As Panels C and D of 
Figure 1 show, many people rated themselves more negatively than their close friends 
rated them.  Moreover, I also found evidence of important individual differences in self-
perceptions of bias.  Many people are conscious of having overly negative self-views.  
This preponderance of self-diminishers is often overlooked in research on motivated 
cognition, and is worthy of further investigation. 
Most important for the current investigation, however, was the finding that 
people’s perceptions of their bias were very accurate.  Self-enhancers largely reported 
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being positively biased and self-diminishers largely reported being negatively biased, and 
this was the case for both agentic and communal personality traits, indicating a general 
awareness of both egoistic and moralistic biases (Paulhus & John, 1998).  How is it that 
people are able to accurately report their biases?  Here I present three possible 
explanations of this effect, each of which has important implications for our 
understanding of self-knowledge. 
First, as already discussed, one possible explanation for how people are able to 
accurately recognize their bias is that they are considering how they believe others see 
them (i.e., their meta-perceptions).  In determining self-bias, people may be considering 
the discrepancy between how they view themselves and how they believe they are 
viewed by others.  The analyses that included meta-perceptions do indicate that 
awareness of bias in self-perceptions is at least in part due to knowing the discrepancy 
between self- and meta-perceptions.  Recall that I did not specify a criterion when asking 
people to report their perceived bias, and participants did not know that I would be using 
informant reports as a criterion (and this was not especially likely to occur to them, 
particularly in Study 2 when the informant nominations were collected nine weeks before 
the self-ratings and perceived bias ratings).  Thus, considering that people are at least in 
part using their meta-perceptions to determine how biased their self-perceptions are, they 
must be doing so because they believe their meta-perceptions are more accurate.  This 
explanation would suggest that, despite believing their meta-perceptions are more 
accurate than their self-perceptions, people nevertheless choose to hang on to their biased 
self-perceptions—a phenomenon consistent with my definition of self-deception.   
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Second, it is possible that people are using heuristics to estimate their bias.  For 
example, if a person initially gave herself a very positive score, she could simply assume 
she was likely too extreme in her original self-perception and therefore rate herself as 
positively biased.  Consistent with this explanation, I did find that perceptions of bias 
were positively correlated with self-perceptions (see Table 2), indicating that people who 
rated themselves more positively tended to rate themselves as positively biased.  
However, these correlations were moderate in size and indicate some variability in bias 
scores even among those with very positive or very negative self-perceptions.  
Alternatively, people may be using slightly more idiosyncratic heuristics.  That is, they 
may have self-views that are more like ranges than point estimates, and they may be 
aware that they tend to “aim high” or “aim low” within their own range of possible self-
views.  This is consistent with the finding that narcissists and self-enhancers are aware 
that they tend to exaggerate their skills and abilities (Carlson et al., 2011).  This type of 
self-awareness is based on the use of accurate heuristics or self-schemas, and, consistent 
with my definition of self-deception, it entails people being aware of their biases but 
choosing not to update their personality self-views accordingly. 
A third possible explanation for people’s ability to accurately report their biases is 
that people are able to consciously toggle between two coexisting self-views—one that is 
more realistic and another that is positively or negatively biased.  The fact that the more 
biased self-view is typically the one that is reported in traditional self-reports suggests 
that it may be the ‘default’ self-view—the one that people prefer to operate with on a 
day-to-day basis.  The more realistic self-view may only be accessed when people deem 
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it necessary or beneficial, and may require that people are explicitly motivated to be 
accurate and to provide a more deliberate and realistic self-evaluation.  This explanation 
is interesting because it raises the question of what function self-perceptions serve.  As 
discussed in the introduction, self-views are influenced by many motivational drives 
(Sedikides & Strube, 1995), and it is reasonable for people to alter their self-perceptions 
according to their goals and what is functional in a given situation.  Thus, it is possible 
that in most situations in which participants complete personality questionnaires, other 
goals or motives are more important than accuracy, and so participants are not using their 
most realistic self-views to complete the questionnaires.  Indeed, it may be rare in 
everyday life for the realistic self-view to be the most functional one.  Biased self-views 
may be more functional for satisfying fundamental needs like the need to belong or the 
need for positive self-regard (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Sedikides, 1993). 
All of these possibilities raise important implications for the use of self-reports.  
People may know more about themselves than what they convey in traditional self-
reports, and if asked in a particular way, people may be able to provide more valid self-
perceptions.  This has important implications for all researchers and practitioners who 
rely on self-reports to predict important outcomes such as health, relationships, 
occupational success, and well-being.  Although behavioral measures and informant 
reports provide valuable additional information, when these sources are not available, it 
may be possible to improve the validity of self-reports by altering their instructions.  
What role might knowledge of bias play in improving self-knowledge?  If people 
are able to recognize how their self-views are affected by bias, and to hold multiple self-
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views simultaneously, they may be more receptive to information that is counter to their 
‘default’ self-view.  Recognizing bias—the discrepancy between self-views and reality—
is likely the first step toward changing inaccurate self-views.  Further, the most effective 
way to improve self-knowledge may be for individuals to learn which of their “selves” is 
most accurate.  Given the role of self-knowledge in interpersonal relations (Kurt & 
Paulhus, 2008; Tenney, Vazire, & Mehl, 2012), health, and occupational success 
(Dunning et al., 2004), more research is needed about how self-knowledge could be 
improved, and how we can capitalize on people’s awareness of their bias to increase self-
knowledge. 
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Table 1  
 
Means for Self-, Meta-, Other-, and Bias-Perceptions for Study 1 
 
 Self- 
perceptions 
Meta-
perceptions 
Other-
perceptions 
Perceived 
bias 
 N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 
Trait   M  SD M  SD   M  SD M  SD 
Extraverted, enthusiastic 9.71 3.42 10.35 3.43 11.09 2.62 .32 1.13 
Dependable, self-disciplined 10.16 3.64 10.89 3.12 11.50 2.76 .05 1.39 
Open to new experiences, complex 11.29 3.00 10.40 2.88 11.53 2.21 .30 1.12 
Sympathetic, warm 10.86 3.36 10.85 2.88 11.18 2.09 .12 1.17 
Calm, emotionally stable 10.55 3.26 9.82 3.15 10.27 2.48 -.03 1.08 
Intelligent 11.28 2.29 11.66 1.87 13.10 1.48 .27 1.07 
Funny 10.43 2.75 11.17 2.05 12.22 1.68 .16 1.11 
Likeable 11.66 2.41 12.28 1.81 13.28 1.54 .23 1.01 
Physically attractive 9.63 2.70 9.98 2.21 11.23 2.33 .06 1.09 
High status 8.78 3.31 9.51 2.76 10.22 1.94 -.05   .86 
 
Note. Self-perceptions and aggregated other-perceptions were completed on 15-point scales and the perceived bias self-report measure 
was completed on a 9-point scale (from -4 to +4).
  
26 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Intercorrelations among Self-, Meta-, Other-, and Bias-Perception Averaged across 10 
Traits 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1. Self-perception - .69** 23† .45** 
2. Meta-perception .70** - .29* .26* 
3. Other-perception .23† .26* - .03 
4. Perceived bias .47** .28* .08 - 
 
Note. 
†
p < .10, **p < .001.  These correlations were calculated using Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation to compute the average across traits, which was then transformed back to 
a correlation.  Study 1 (N = 65) correlations are above the diagonal and Study 2 (N = 65) 
correlations are below the diagonal.  Significance for correlations was based on estimated 
sample significance levels of p < .10 for rs  .20, p < .05 for rs  .24, and p < .001 for rs 
 .43.  
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Table 3 
 
Self-Other, Self-Meta, and Meta-Other Discrepancy Scores Correlated with Bias-Perceptions for Study 1 and Study 2 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Self-other 
residual 
Self-meta 
residual 
Meta-other 
residual 
Self-other 
residual 
Self-meta 
residual 
Meta-other 
residual 
Trait N = 65  N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 
Extraverted, enthusiastic .32** .30* .15 .38* .25* .30* 
Dependable, self-disciplined .55** .43** .35** .36** .20 .30* 
Open to new experiences, complex .39** .30* .25* .41* .29* .24
†
 
Sympathetic, warm .55** .45** .36** .45** .46** .17 
Calm, emotionally stable .64** .62** .21
†
 .65** .41** .49** 
Intelligent .40** .30* .25* .34* .31* .15 
Funny .54** .52** .20 .52** .36** .30* 
Likeable .30* .25* .18 .54** .44** .14 
Physically attractive .41** .23
†
 .34** .53** .49** .26* 
High status .35** .28* .21
†
 .46** .33** .34** 
 
Note. 
† 
p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .001. Self-other residuals are standardized residuals that were formed by regressing self-reports onto 
informant reports.  Self-meta residuals are standardized residuals that were formed by regressing self-reports onto meta-perceptions. 
Meta-other residuals are standardized residuals that were formed by regressing meta-perceptions onto informant reports.
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Table 4  
 
Means for Self-, Meta-, Other-, and Bias-Perceptions for Study 2 
 
 Self- 
perceptions 
Meta-
perceptions 
Other-
perceptions 
Perceived 
bias 
 N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 N = 65 
Trait M  SD M  SD M  SD   M  SD 
Extraverted, enthusiastic 10.62 3.06 10.51 2.84 11.33 2.35 .22   .96 
Dependable, self-disciplined 11.42 2.79 11.86 2.23 11.95 2.83 .32 1.13 
Open to new experiences, complex 11.28 2.93 10.51 2.57 10.89 2.94 .43 1.03 
Sympathetic, warm 11.48 3.04 11.47 2.51 11.67 2.68 .26 1.04 
Calm, emotionally stable 10.37 3.69 10.60 2.70 10.48 3.46 .02 1.11 
Intelligent 12.06 1.49 12.24 1.44 13.24 1.66 .03 1.09 
Funny 10.83 2.71 11.27 2.16 12.03 2.23 .32 1.00 
Likeable 11.97 2.15 12.49 1.51 13.42 2.12 .12 1.02 
Physically attractive 10.48 2.36 11.16 1.65 11.31 2.83 -.03 1.13 
High status 9.32 2.86 11.08 2.33 11.71 2.66 .00   .98 
 
Note. Self-perceptions and aggregated other-perceptions were completed on 15-point scales and the perceived bias self-report measure 
was completed on a 9-point scale (from -4 to +4).
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C.  Funny: Study 1 
Figure 1. Histograms of Perceived Bias (Panels A and B) and Actual Bias (Panels C and 
D) for the Trait ‘Funny’ in Study 1 and Study 2  
 
 
   
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The histograms of perceived bias scores (Panels A and B) consist of participants’ 
responses on the 9-point perceived bias measure for the trait ‘funny’.  The histograms of 
actual bias scores (Panels C and D) consist of standardized residuals created by 
regressing self-ratings on aggregated informant-ratings.  Sample size varied slightly by 
trait and only included participants who had completed traditional self-perceptions and 
perceived bias reports, and had at least one informant respond. 
A.  Funny: Study 1 B.  Funny: Study 2 
D.  Funny: Study 2 
